UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

TZVI WEISS, et al., * Case Nos. 05-CV-4622(DLI)

* 07-CV-0916(DLI)

Plaintiffs, *

* Brooklyn, New York * September 15, 2011

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NATIONAL WESTMINSTER BANK,

*

Defendant.

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TRANSCRIPT OF CIVIL CAUSE FOR MOTION HEARING
BEFORE THE HONORABLE MARILYN D. GO
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

V.

For the Applebaum Plaintiffs: JOEL ISRAEL, ESQ.

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For the Weiss Plaintiffs: JOSHUA GLATTER, ESQ.

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AVI E. LUFT, ESQ.

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Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording, transcript produced by transcription service.

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2 1 (Proceedings commenced at 2:11 p.m.) 2 THE CLERK: Civil cause for motion hearing, 3 Weiss, et al. vs. National Westminster Bank, docket no. 05-4622, Applebaum vs. National Westminster Bank, PLC, docket 4 no. 07-916. 5 Counsel, please state your appearances for the 6 7 record starting with plaintiff. 8 MR. ISRAEL: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Joel 9 Israel from Sales Werbner here on behalf of the Applebaum plaintiffs. 10 MR. GLATTER: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Joshua 11 Glatter, OSEN LLC, on behalf of the Weiss plaintiffs. 12 MR. SCHLANGER: Aaron Schlanger, OSEN LLC, on 13 behalf of the Weiss plaintiffs. 14 15 MR. FRIEDMAN: Lawrence Friedman, Cleary Gottlieb 16 Steen & Hamilton, n behalf of National Westminster Bank. 17 MR. LUFT: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Avi Luft of Cleary Gottlieb Steen and Hamilton, LLP on behalf of 18 19 National Westminster Bank. 20 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 21 Well, we have two motions to deal with. I've 22 looked at the submissions. They are, thankfully -- the 23 motions to compel contention interrogatories are thankfully 24 shorter than the last set I had to deal with, so I'll just 25 go through them.

3 1 Is there anything that the attorneys want -- if 2 you want to have a short argument before I blab on with 3 what my impressions are, I'll give you an opportunity to 4 speak. So I have no preference. We'll start with the 5 defendant's motion to compel. 6 7 MR. FRIEDMAN: Sure, Your Honor. 8 THE COURT: Is there anything you want to add to 9 your papers? MR. FRIEDMAN: The only thing I would say, Your 10 Honor, very briefly, subject to any questions Your Honor 11 has, is that we chose a template for our interrogatories 12 very deliberately, which is if you contend -- do you 13 contend X? 14 15 And if you contend X, then tell us the basis for that 16 contention. 17 And the plaintiffs have now told us in their 18 August 26th letter that there are things that we're asking 19 about that they say they have no idea about one way or the 20 other and they also say we can have no idea about one way 21 or the other, and that is the question of what was within 22 the knowledge of the U.K. law enforcement and regulators. And if that is so, as I've explained to 23

And if that is so, as I've explained to plaintiff's counsel, then merely say we're not making that contention.

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And if they say they're not making that contention, then they don't have to say anything more.

But if they are making that contention, they can't have their cake and eat it too. They can't say we are making a contention, but we're not going to tell you what underlies it.

And that is the unifying principle between the — unifying principle that runs through three of the contention interrogatories at issue; 17, 18 and 24. Each of them asks are you contending X with respect to the information that was available to the U.K. law enforcement agencies and regulators in relations to NatWest and respect to 24, the question is are you contending that the U.K.'s decision not to sanction Interpal, or not to bring charges against Interpal, was based on anything other than the merits?

And this is extremely, important, Your Honor, because we are going to argue -- and again, this has nothing to do with any notion that these claims are precluded because the U.S. and the U.K. government decided not to proceed against Interpal.

It all has to do with Nat West's state of mind and we're entitled to argue that among the reasons why plaintiff's scienter allegations are implausible, is that the U.K. government decided there was no basis charge

Interpal. Decided there was no basis to sanction Interpal and NatWest had relied on that as one of the ingredients for what it did.

So therefore, if we are going to argue, as we are, that plaintiff's argument that NatWest knew something that the U.K. government has said to this very day it does not now, if we're going to make the argument that it is implausible that NatWest knew something, that the U.K. government has said that it does not know, then we need to know whether the plaintiffs are going to respond to that by saying well, you can't cite what the U.K. government did because it did not have as much information as you did, so therefore the U.K. government's decisions don't impeach our scienter allegation.

If they're going to respond to us in that way, then they must identify what it is they say that the U.K. government didn't have that we should have given them.

And the same thing with respect to the decision not to sanction. And I'm not making that up out of whole cloth, Your Honor. One of their experts, Gary Walters, in paragraph 241 of his report, said I believe NatWest did not make full disclosure to the U.K. government.

So therefore, we're entitled to know whether they're going to meet out argument that the U.K. government's decisions render implausible their allegation

that we knew more than our own government did.

We need to know whether they're going to respond to that by saying it's because we didn't make adequate disclosure to the U.K. government. Then, if so, what that is.

If, as Mr. Israel said, in his August 26th letter, we, the plaintiffs, have no idea what the U.K. government knew, then that's fine. Then tell us you're not making that contention and the issue is moot.

Same thing with respect to no. 24, Your Honor.

As Your Honor knows, the U.K. government has consistently said we are not going to sanction Interpal.

This actually comes up in Parliament from time to time, where members of Parliament seek confirmation that the U.K. government is not going to sanction Interpal and Her Majesty's government confirms that they're not.

We need to know whether the plaintiffs are going to respond to our reliance on the U.K. government's decision no to sanction Interpal as something that renders their scienter allegation implausible, because it's implausible that NatWest knew something more than the U.K. government.

We need to know whether they're going to respond but that's because the U.K. government, made a political decision, not a decision on the merits.

And, in fact, one of their experts at his deposition purported to say well, we all know the U.K. government decides things for reasons. He also said that about the French government.

I just need to know are you going to argue that the U.K. government's decision was not on the merits and if so, tell me what your basis is for that so that I'm prepared to meet that argument. That's what contention interrogatories are all about.

So that's the theme that runs through the four. Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. ISRAEL: Your Honor, if I may, I think first I can safely clarify for plaintiffs that we're not hiding the ball. We're not holding back information. We're not going to later try and use some piece of evidence or documents that we haven't used, or that we haven't produced or that we don't have to somehow prove a point. We're not hiding the ball.

But I think what's most enlightening is that in the reply briefs that NatWest filed, they state on the --page 3 in the second paragraph, "NatWest is not seeking discovery from plaintiffs concerning the information that the U.K. authorities had in their possession or what they believed about Interpal. The former is revealed in the information NatWest repeatedly disclosed to the U.K.

authorities in those authorities own reports of their investigations, and the latter is confirmed by those authority's repeated decisions not to pursue any charges against or to impose any sanctions against Interpal."

What's so important about that passage, Your
Honor, is NatWest -- they show clear as day here what
they're trying to do. They're trying to say that what the
government -- the entire U.K. government, or specifically
at least six or seven different departments had in its
possession is what we, NatWest, gave them and then the
several different reports that the charity commission filed
and what the NatWest -- sorry. What the U.K. government
state of mind was was demonstrated in the few public
reports that the government submitted, namely, the charity
commission and the few public statements made by government
officials in Parliament.

NatWest didn't take discovery in this case on what the U.K. government knew, what it had, what it possessed, what its state of mind was, what its reasons were for not designating Interpal, for not indicting Interpal, for not doing anything with regards to Interpal, but they're trying to make the deduction by saying okay, if plaintiffs don't contend, even though we don't know and can't know what the government had, what its state of mind was, therefore, plaintiff's don't know and what we're

saying is well, we gave the government this; we gave the government this. We saw this governmental reports and we know that the government didn't designate. Therefore, this is what the government had in its possession and this is what the government believed.

Well, they can't do that. They could have taken discovery. They could have hired an expert. They didn't hire any experts on the issue of what the U.K. government - what its knowledge was, how it handles cases like this, what its state of mind was. But they didn't do any of that.

So they're looking for an evidentiary shortcut here and they show that quite clearly here. They're trying to say that okay; this is what we gave them, and Your Honor, that's why our response to no. 17, which was cross referenced in the other responses, was all we know is this is the information that NatWest had based on the production they gave us, and this is what they gave to the U.K. government.

And more specifically what our exhibits to that response included is this is what based on the record we've seen it does not appear NatWest gave to the U.K. government.

Did the U.K. government have that information from other sources? We don't know. Certainly, in terms of

internal correspondence within NatWest we wouldn't think so, but we don't know that.

We don't know if all of the -- for instance, one of the suspicious transactions that NatWest customer

Interpal conducted as with the Islamic Charitable Society and we know that they reported one specific transfer.

Did they give the U.K. government all of the other transfers that Interpal conducted with that particular entity? We haven't seen any record of that.

Did the U.K. government have other information related to those transfers? We don't know.

THE COURT: Actually, Mr. Israel, the interrogatory -- at least interrogatory 17, talks about whether or not you contend they had documents beyond what NatWest had. So --

MR. ISRAEL: Sure. Your Honor, and that's why we gave them all we could.

THE COURT: Well --

MR. ISRAEL: All we know is what NatWest had and didn't give. We don't know, as we've said, we don't know what the U.K. government had beyond that. We don't know what it could have gotten from Interpal.

And so, again, the problem here is, as Mr. Friedman eloquently said back at the June hearing in Credit Lyonnais, when the issue was Hamas attribution, which

clearly plaintiffs carry the burden of proof, clearly there's reams of evidence on that in this case. He said Credit Lyonnais isn't prepared to take a position.

Well, respectfully, that issue is at the core of this case. I mean, that's a fundamental issue in this case.

The issue of what the U.K. government had, what its state of mind was. We contend that's irrelevant to NatWest's state of mind.

But we're even more ill equipped than Credit
Lyonnais contended it was to respond to these contention
interrogatories because, frankly, we did not -- we did not
propound discovery on what the -- I'm sorry. We did not
produce discovery on what the U.K. government had --

THE COURT: Well, am I hearing you say that the answer is no?

MR. ISRAEL: The answer is we don't know. The answer is we're not equipped to take a position --

THE COURT: Well, couldn't you just say the answer is no based on what you do know?

Mr. ISRAEL: Well, I would repeat Mr. Friedman's concern in the Credit Lyonnais case that using this as a sound bite, where we're made some sort of admission, where we don't think NatWest has met any sort of burden where it could contend what the government knew and what its state

of mind was and what documents it possessed and so they're going to then say to Judge Irizarry and say to a jury well, plaintiffs has said -- have acknowledged that they don't know -- that they're not contending what the U.K. government had.

They're not contending that the U.K. government had more information than NatWest or what its state of mind was and why it didn't designate Interpal and, therefore, he's what we're telling you and therefore, they've established it conclusively because we didn't have any information to rebut it.

So really the roles are reversed here, except we contend not on an issue that goes to the core of this case, but an irrelevant issue as to the state of mind of the government.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Your Honor, if I may, your question put the finger on it. Mr. Israel is confusing facts and contentions.

I'm not asking him to give me facts. I'm saying are you contending X and Your Honor put your finger on it. You said isn't the answer no. He's repeatedly saying the answer is no, they are not going to contend X. It is not — the plaintiffs don't have the freedom to say I'm not going to tell you what I'm contending, and I'm not asking him for facts. The Credit Lyonnais analogy is completely

13 1 inapt. 2 There they asked us --3 THE COURT: I don't even want to hear about that. 4 MR. FRIEDMAN: Okay. Your Honor -- and again, I am not making this up out of whole cloth. Their expert, 5 Gary Walters, said in his report that we made inadequate 6 7 disclosure to the U.K. government. And when I deposed him, he confirmed that it's 8 9 his view that we made inadequate disclosure to the U.K. government. 10 Of course, when I went through every fact that he 11 said was not disclosed, I was able to establish that it 12 13 does appear in one of our disclosures. 14 So again, with respect -- with great respect for 15 Mr. Israel, he does not have the freedom to say I'm not 16 going to tell you what I contend or not. I'm asking do you 17 contend that NatWest had more information -- had 18 information about Interpal that was not available -- was 19 not in the possession of the U.K. authorities or could not 20 be obtained by them from Interpal. 21 He can't say I pass. He has to say yes, I do 22 contend that or I don't contend it. And that's why we're 23 here. 24 MR. ISRAEL: Your Honor, I would just say to 25 that, if an improper interrogatory, we don't have to

contend or not.

And I would add to that, in terms of Mr. Walters, what Mr. Walters said, which is exactly what we're saying, is simply NatWest should have disclosed this information and we'll set aside the dispute over the facts and whether or not they were disclosed.

But he's not testifying as to --

THE COURT: Well, that's interrogatory 18. Let's focus on 17.

MR. ISRAEL: Sure. Sure. Sure.

MR. FRIEDMAN: The reason I need to know, Your Honor, is, again, I need to know if they are going to make a certain argument in response to my argument.

My argument, again, is the authority said we do not know that Interpal is funding Hamas or Hamas terrorism. And I am entitled to argue that the fact that the U.K. authorities say that they did not know this renders implausible plaintiff's argument that NatWest did know it.

One way plaintiffs could respond to my argument is ah-ha. That syllogism doesn't work because you may have had information that the U.K. authorities did not have available to them.

So I need to know whether they're going to make that argument and what their basis is for making that argument and, again, if they're not making that contention,

then we're done.

MR. GLATTER: Your Honor, this is Josh Glatter.

Just if I can add a few comments to my colleague, Mr.

Israel's points.

As he noted, the threshold question is whether or not the interrogatory itself is proper before one gets to the secondary question of whether the defendant is entitled to supplementation.

There are two things that I think the court should keep in mind in evaluating what decision to reach with respect to all three of these interrogatories.

One of them is that many years ago Judge Sifton held with respect to the *mens rea* prong --

THE COURT: Well, I --

MR. GLATTER: -- that the standard to be applied is whether it was considered a terrorist by the standards of the United States.

So there's a question --

THE COURT: That's not exactly what he said and his decision was rendered in the context of a motion to dismiss, which given the procedural posture of the case at the time that he rendered decision, you know -- it is not directly applicable to the issue we're discussing today.

And I'm not -- I will look -- I have looked at the interrogatory. I'm happily out of the business of

drafting discovery requests, but --

MR. GLATTER: But my point, Judge, was that it's just that the argument that's being put forward by defendant is, I was going to say -- I'd say minimally is a questionable premise legally and ultimately that will be a legal determination as to whether or not reliance upon a foreign regulator's assessment of the customer and the customer's connections to an FTO.

And so that fundamentally turns on the legal questions that will be sorted out either --

THE COURT: Well --

MR. GLATTER: -- at summary judgment or pretrial motion practice.

The second thing which Judge Sifton has consistently held is that the standard for mens rea is recklessness, criminal recklessness, as that's been defined under the model penal code.

And so in terms of the suggestion that NatWest did not have existential knowledge that the allegations concerning Interpol were correct based on the views of this foreign regulator, and to the extent that's being used to channel a demand for a supplemental response to these interrogatories, or for that matter, to interrogatory 20, I'd submit is incorrect, or at least has to be evaluated under the actual mens rea standard.

THE COURT: I would have reread his decision a little more carefully if I thought it had bene necessary but I think given the procedural posture of the motion, a motion to dismiss based on the allegations of the complaint, I read his holding far narrower and he was simply saying that NatWest doesn't win by claiming reliance on the British authorities.

MR. GLATTER: Nor do we claim that now and I think I made clear in my reply letter that that's a strong mischaracterization that I think should not distract the court.

All of this bears on our state of mind, which is at the heart of the case, and we're entitled to know what their contentions are about our state of mind.

MR. ISRAEL: Your Honor, if I can add one further point, since we're focused on no. 17.

You know, the second part of this is what information the government could have possessed -- sorry -- could have requested from Interpal and so what Interpal had in its possession, certainly there, if nothing else, we can't know what the government could have done with regards to Interpal.

We can't know what information Interpal possessed, you know, and that's why we prepared the exhibit to this response because, again, we tried to include

information that we hadn't seen that NatWest had provided the government and that we didn't think Interpal was likely to possess; you know, 17-page transfer confirmations and those sort of things.

Obviously, internal correspondence, but you look at this closer on this second part with regards to Interpal, there's just no way for either party to know.

MR. ISRAEL: Again, Your Honor, I can make this very easy.

If their position is, as stated in the August 26th letter, that they don't have the basis to make this contention, then they should say they're not making this contention.

But that's not what they did. In their interrogatory response they said we do make this contention. They say there's a multitude -- what was the wording they used? A multitude of pertinent information that was in NatWest's possession that wasn't disclosed. Well, you can't have it both ways.

Now, they did contradict themselves in their letter to Your Honor and they said we don't know one way or the other.

I hate to repeat myself, but if they don't know one way or the other, then the answer to the interrogatory is no. We'll stop.

THE COURT: I agree with -- if you -- if the answer is maybe yes, you can say maybe yes, but you've got to refine your response and the list.

Based on what I've heard and what I've read, you clearly do have information regarding what NatWest did provide, so simply attaching a list of all the documents regarding Interpal that NatWest may have doesn't suffice to be as an answer if your answer is, you know, you have reason to believe -- you may make that contention.

MR. ISRAEL: I think, respectfully, Mr. Friedman's confusing the two issues in terms of what NatWest provided the U.K. government, versus -- did not provide the U.K. government versus what the U.K. government actually had and that's where the disconnect is, Your Honor, and that's why our answer is, frankly, we don't know.

MR. FRIEDMAN: The answer is --

THE COURT: Well, I mean, you can break your answer into two parts. There are two parts; did not have in their possession and could not have requested from Interpal information concerning Interpal and the other part is, you know, whether or not it had -- I mean, it is actually one phrase, but it is also whether or not they didn't have in their possession documents that NatWest had in its possession is one -- is whether or not it could have

been requested -- requested Interpal information and whether or not NatWest had documents. I think you could break it down to be more specific.

MR. ISRAEL: Okay.

THE COURT: You know, to the extent that you're going to argue that NatWest didn't disclose information to the U.K. government that it could not have otherwise obtained from Interpal, then you should respond accordingly.

Okay. 18, which really --

MR. FRIEDMAN: I think it's the same theme, Your Honor.

THE COURT: It's basically the same.

MR. FRIEDMAN: If their answer to 17 is yes, then the answer is 18 is also yes and they need to tell us what they're talking about.

THE COURT: But I do think your Exhibit E is not a responsive document. It's a -- you really -- I assume, have more information at hand that would help you narrow the list and help you better identify the documents than what you have in Exhibit E.

MR. ISRAEL: We would agree, Your Honor. 18 follows after 17. There's similarities in the two.

THE COURT: And then 24.

MR. ISRAEL: Again, Your Honor, we would argue

that 24 is different and specifically ask why U.K. law enforcement chose to do what it did. Was it based on evidence in its possession? Was it based on any other reason and there's absolute no evidence in this case as to why the U.K. government did not designate Interpal, again, other than a few lines of public testimony given by several individuals in Parliament. We don't know why the U.K. government chose not to designate Interpal. We don't know why it chose not to indict Interpal. It did not. I mean, there' no dispute over that.

But again, this gets into the state of mind of the U.K. government, which we still feel is irrelevant and make the interrogatory improper, but even beyond that, again, neither party can simply know why the U.K. law enforcement, which is seven different departments, made some sort monolithic decision to designate or not to designate and why they did so.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Then, Your Honor, the answer to the interrogatory is no, because --

MR. ISRAEL: Your Honor --

MR. FRIEDMAN: Excuse me. Because we are going to say -- we already have said not the straw man, that because the U.K. didn't indict and didn't sanction, that gets us off the hook.

Rather, we're going to say look. You're saying

that NatWest knew X. To this day, the U.K. government, with all of their resources, say they still don't know X. That makes your allegation about what we know implausible, because it's implausible and it impeaches your allegation that this bank would know more than, as Joel just describes — as Mr. Israel just described, the seven agencies of the U.K. government.

We are entitled to know the following: Are plaintiffs going to respond to that by saying well, the U.K. government's decision not to indict and not to sanction is not indicative of anything because it was based on political considerations, or because it was based on what the gueen had for breakfast that day.

We're entitled to know if they're going to say if it was based on anything other than the merits.

If, as I just heard Mr. Israel say, they're not going to make that contention, then we're done.

MR. ISRAEL: You -- I'm sorry, Mr. Friedman. I don't want to interrupt you again.

In this case, Your Honor, with respect to interrogatory 24, it's I think -- respectfully it's even further appeals from the party's claims and defenses in 17 and 18.

17 and 18 at least are touching upon comparisons, or relative access, or possession, vis-a-vis the defendant.

This one is purely asking for us to essentially speculate as to a variety of potential reasons, of which I can personally think of many, as to why the British government did or did not decide to take particular action involving Interpal.

THE COURT: Well --

MR. FRIEDMAN: And obviously we would reserve our right at trial, or at any time up to it, to seek to preclude introduction of evidence on this issue because it could be very prejudicial and confusing to a jury.

But with respect to the interrogatory I think because this one is not even really touching at all upon the defendant, it is therefore not related to the party's claims and defenses, notwithstanding Mr. Friedman's heroic effort to link it up to scienter, and as such flunks the basic test of Rule 26.

THE COURT: Well, I'll answer that -- I'll respond. There is a connection because if your expert is saying politics and whatever other factors may have played into the decision not to designate Interpal and whatever evidence your expert had presumably is evidence that might be generally available to the public and hence NatWest, that would factor into the argument that you would make about the scienter of NatWest with respect to its transactions with Interpal.

MR. ISRAEL: Your Honor, in that regard we can certainly double check it. But my recollection is that although certain of our punitive case-in-chief experts may have narrated the fact that the U.K. government has not to date sanctioned Interpal or taken any other action or agreed to with the U.S. or Israeli designations, I don't believe any of them have proffered opinions in their reports as to why that's the case.

It may be that at a deposition one of the defendant's lawyers may have asked them to solicit their opinion on that score, but that does not -- the fact that they may have allowed them to answer wouldn't mean that we were proffering that as evidence in the case.

MR. GLATTER: First of all, one of their experts, Mr. -- or Dr. Levitt, did say that he believes the British government had other reasons, but he refused to disclose to us what he thought those were.

But it doesn't matter whether their experts have said it or not. If their experts haven't said it, that's another reason why they shouldn't be able to make this contention, because they haven't ventilated it in discovery.

THE COURT: So is your -- wait. So is your answer no? Is that what I'm hearing you say, Mr. Glatter?

MR. GLATTER: It is my answer that I do not

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        contend one way or the other why the U.K. government --
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                  THE COURT: It's not one way or the other. Do
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        you contend or don't you contend? If you don't contend,
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        you don't contend.
                  MR. GLATTER: In other words, the lack of
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        contention is not, therefore, a concession and --
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                  THE COURT: It is -- that's right.
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                  MR. GLATTER: Correct. And I think I -- subject
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        to concurrence with my colleagues, I think that's pretty
        much where we --
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                  THE COURT: We'll take it as a no, hopefully.
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                  MR. FRIEDMAN: All right. Well, that should
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        moot no. 24, because I understand the plaintiffs are not
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        contending that the decision not to sanction Interpal was
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        for any reason other than on the merits.
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                  MR. GLATTER:
                                But, Your Honor, just for purposes
        of record preservation, the fact that we don't contend it
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        is a different matter from whether or not the defendant
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        chooses to open the door on that issue in their case in
        chief, our ability to rebut it would not be cut off by our
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        failure to affirmatively contend it in respect to this
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        interrogatory
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                  MR. FRIEDMAN: Well, that can't be, Your Honor,
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        because that would throw contention interrogatories out the
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window. That would mean that I could be surprised at trial

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as to one of their contentions and frankly, Mr. Glatter, in deciding whether to make a contention or not, I'm entitled to know what your rebuttal would be in response to that contention.

So it's really -- if anyone is reading this transcript a year or so from now, it's really remarkable that plaintiffs are being so squirrely in refusing to be pinned down on this and it leads me to think that I need to press farther and Your Honor should press farther in finding out what's going on here.

The question is very simple; are you making this contention or not? And I am telling you that I may make that contention, but whether I do or not is not excuse for plaintiffs to avoid the issue.

MR. ISRAEL: Your Honor, there's nothing squirrely about believing this interrogatories are improper. Obviously, if the court feels differently then that's one thing, but there's nothing squirrely about our position here. There's nothing squirrely about what we're trying to do other than thinking, again, these interrogatories are improper and irrelevant.

MR. FRIEDMAN: I'm just reacting to Mr. Glatter's response that he reserves the right to make this contention if I make the contrary contention and he can't do that.

MR. GLATTER: Your Honor, there's I think a material different between asking whether or not plaintiffs affirmatively contend something versus our ability to rebut a contention that the defendant plans to make. Those are two distinct issues.

MR. FRIEDMAN: There's no difference, Your

Honor. And if there were such a difference, then we would

have a trial by ambush. We don't have trial by ambush.

One of the ways we avoid trial by ambush is allowing for

contention interrogatories. This contention interrogatory

says -- asks, do you contend X? They've got to answer yes

or no.

It's not a conditional yes or no. It's yes or no. Their version of the truth is their version of the truth.

I'm asking what their version of the truth is. Their version of the truth doesn't change depending on what I say. It is what it is.

MR. GLATTER: Your Honor, I don't agree with Mr. Friedman's representations on that score. I think perhaps, however, to save everyone time, it's fair to say that our response to this interrogatory — it's obviously without waiver of our rights to seek to move in limine on any grounds that we think are appropriate closer to the time of trial.

If we believe, in other words, that Mr. Friedman

has mischaracterized -- or rather not Mr. Friedman, but

NatWest is mischaracterizing or distorting the import of

response to a contention interrogatory, obviously, that's

something either this court of Judge Irizarry can assess at

the appropriate time.

MR. FRIEDMAN: So I take it the answer to the contention interrogatory is no.

MR. GLATTER: As I said --

THE COURT: I just want to hear --

MR. GLATTER: As I said earlier, Your Honor we are not going to affirmatively contend or speculate as to the reasons why the British government has not taken a particular action against Interpal.

MR. FRIEDMAN: I am concerned only because I've had the pleasure of spending so much time with Mr. Glatter and know how careful a lawyer he is. I'm concerned about his answering the question by saying we will not affirmatively contend. I think we need to know that they will either contend it or not contend it; either affirmatively or defensively.

I need to know so that I can decide what contentions I'm going to bring forward and what they're going to say in response.

MR. GLATTER: I suppose the problem with this is that, as Mr. Israel alluded to earlier, our fundamental

position is that whether the U.K. government did or did not, or have some particular subjective reasons why it chose not to take action against Interpal is utterly irrelevant to this case.

Now it may be that at the end of the day somebody disagrees, but because we believe that's irrelevant and may take certain positions with respect to evidence that's sought to be introduced by the defendant in those regards, I have to issue a reservation of rights here.

MR. FRIEDMAN: I understand --

MR. GLATTER: And, again, I'm being asked through the vehicle of the contention interrogatory whether or not we affirmatively contend X. The fact that we affirmatively contend X, as Your Honor agreed before, is not a concession that, in fact, they did it for the reasons that Mr. Friedman, or Mr. Luft, or NatWest's in-house counsel might suggest.

That's an issue that has to wait --

THE COURT: Well, let me just ask Mr. Friedman, I assume you are going to say that the British government didn't designate Interpal for -- after a very careful examination, et cetera, and that your reasonablely relied on that.

MR. FRIEDMAN: What I'm going to say, Your Honor, is here is the admissible evidence of what the

British government said. It is a fact that the British government said this. It is a fact that the British government didn't sanction and didn't bring criminal charges -- any charges against Interpal to this very day.

It is a fact that NatWest was aware of that. It is a fact that, as Your Honor knows from the correspondence, that NatWest asked the British government what are you going to do and the British government said we have no plans to sanction them or to bring charges against them. Yes.

And NatWest -- that was part of what NatWest relied upon in acting as it did. It used the British government as its most relevant authoritative source on this and the British government said it had no basis to bring charges.

And I'm also going to argue, subject to hearing what they would say in response, that the very fact that the British government decided not to sanction and not to charge to his very day, parenthetically, in one of the few instances in which the Blair government declined to follow what the then U.S. government asked them to do in relation to the war on terror, which is also significant in and of itself, yes, that that impeaches plaintiff's scienter allegation.

And I am entitled to know whether they will

respond that the British government's decisions are something that are -- are something that is irrelevant and unreliable because it was based on factors separate from the British government's assessment of the merits.

That's my interrogatory and I'm entitled to know whether they're going to make that argument and if so, what their basis for it is.

THE COURT: Well, I think what Mr. Friedman is saying is they want to know that you're going to attack the legitimacy of the determination made by the British government in making your argument that NatWest should have known, or that it didn't actually rely, or that it didn't reasonably rely on the determination of the British government.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Your Honor --

THE COURT: And that's why I said you could say you don't contend, but you could still respond to some of the defendant's contentions regarding its scienter without implicating the merits of the decision by the U.K. government.

MR. ISRAEL: Understood, Your Honor. And Mr. Friedman just exemplified the problem with these interrogatories, understanding we're probably ready to move on, but we hadn't heard about the Blair government and its view towards what the U.S. does and its rare decision to

buck the U.S.

MR. FRIEDMAN: That was just an editorial comment in Brooklyn on a Thursday afternoon. That's not --

THE COURT: That's (inaudible). All I'm just saying is if you say now you're not prejudiced, you're not constrained in attacking the defendant's reliance on the British government's decision. But if you do say no, you are constrained in attacking how that decision was made.

And so it's really more a focus on whether or not you're going to attack the decision making process and the ultimate decision as opposed to attacking NatWest's reliance on that determination.

MR. GLATTER: But, Your Honor, I think that this highlights a very serious problem with the interrogatory, which is it's one thing to say that's not something I contend.

And it's another thing to say that's not something I contend and, therefore, it should be inferred from that that the reason that the British government took this action is because it was -- because, in fact, the evidence in the British government's possession was insufficient to warrant that action.

Those are two different -- it's one thing to say that's a not a contention I'm making in my case in chief.

It's another thing to say it's not a contention I'm making

and, therefore, you should infer that I agree with the supposition baked into this interrogatory. That's our concern.

And that's why I made my remark abut reserving rights in terms of if the defendant is able, or intends to present evidence and suggests that the evidence was insufficient in the U.K. government's -- I don't know how they'd be able to do that, because I don't know how they know why or what the U.K. government in its entire guise knew or --

THE COURT: You're worried about the defendant taking that contention?

MR. GLATTER: Correct. If the defendant -- in other words, the fact that I don't make the contention does not, therefore, mean that I should -- if the defendant so contends that the U.K. government did not sanction Interpal because the evidence in its possession was insufficient, that I do not have an ability to rebut that if -- and if that is even allowed into evidence on relevancy grounds.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Your Honor, he's arguing the relevancy of this. I'm not asking him to concede that the British government was right. I'm asking him to tell me are you going to argue that the British government made its decision based on factors other than its perception of the merits. That's it.

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MR. GLATTER: And if I say -- well, again, if I say I am not going to argue that in my case in chief, Mr. Friedman's position seems to be that I also cannot respond to it if it's raised in the defendant's case in chief, and that's troubling.
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THE COURT: All right.

MR. FRIEDMAN: And my response is that case in chief rebuttal doesn't matter. Are you making the contention --

MR. GLATTER: Which is --

MR. FRIEDMAN: Excuse me. He keeps --

THE COURT: Mr. Friedman, let me get down to a practical level. The concern is that you will be making that contention.

MR. FRIEDMAN: I will.

THE COURT: You will.

MR. FRIEDMAN: I will be contending that the British government's decision was based on its perception of the merits, that I'm going to be presenting the British government's position and there it is.

And I am entitled to know whether they're going to try to impeach that decision with an argument that those who published that decision based their decision on something other than their perception of the merits. And that's all it is.

And plaintiffs I've heard say repeatedly this afternoon, we are not going to make that contention affirmatively, but we reserve the right to make that contention in response, and they can't do that.

Contention interrogatories are not divided among case in chief contention interrogatories and rebuttal.

I'm entitled to know whether they're going to make that argument at any time.

MR. GLATTER: Your Honor, in the hopes of truncating this discussion, I don't know what a rebuttal contention is.

My point was that to the extent that the defendant intends to present that argument and that evidence, obviously, we reserve our rights to object to it and we reserve our rights to rebut it in some fashion at trial, if it comes to that.

I thought that I had saved everybody time by saying --

THE COURT: Well, I guess it can come to that.

You're referring to (indiscernible) that he will make that contention (indiscernible).

MR. GLATTER: But if ultimately he wants at trial to wield a response to a contention interrogatory somehow precluding us from offering any rebuttal, anything to suggest to a jury that there might have been other

reasons for that, if and only if that is allowed into evidence, I would presume that all parties reserve their rights as to the introduction of the contention interrogatory into evidence and that will be dealt with at a later time. I'm not quite sure why we have to have the fight today.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Your Honor, Mr. Glatter, with all due respect -- and I don't mean this to be pejorative -- did just a complete 180. He has been saying -- he and Mr. Israel have been saying for 20 minutes, we're not going to make that contention because who knows why they decided what they did.

Well, respectfully, they do know why they decided, or what they say is the reasons they decided because these decisions are not just yes or no decisions.

We have the Charity Commission reports, we have statements by Her Majesty's government. So there is evidence.

Mr. Glatter, after telling Your Honor for 20 minutes we're not making this contention, just did a 180 and told Your Honor we are going to make this contention in response to their making the contention that Friedman says he's going to make and I'm entitled to know -- and what I'm now hearing is the answer to the contention interrogatory is yes and if it's yes, then I'm entitled to have discovery

as to what are the bases for saying the decision was based on anything other than the British government's perception of the facts.

THE COURT: (Indiscernible) if you're going to challenge that contention (indiscernible).

MR. ISRAEL: Okay. So that I understand Your Honor's ruling, in other words, if at any time we believe that there might have been other reasons beyond the evidence in hand, then those should be identified in the responses.

THE COURT: (Indiscernible).

MR. ISRAEL: Okay. I understand, Your Honor. Thank you.

MR. FRIEDMAN: And on our motion, Your Honor, that leaves contention interrogatory no. 20, which asks the plaintiffs to list, as supplemented by our meet and confer in bullet points, the actions that they believe the bank should have taken or should have refrained from taking to avoid liability.

Their response is that that is inviting speculation and it invites them to provide an answer on something in which they don't bear the burden of proof and I just don't understand that.

It's not speculative because we're saying if you contend there are actions that we should have taken or

should have refrained from taking, please tell us what those actions are. It's no speculation. We want them to answer only with the actions they plan to contend we should have taken or refrained from taking.

And as to burden of proof, if there are actions they say we should taken or refrained from taking, they bear the burden of proving that.

A simple analogy, Your Honor, if someone is sued for failure to maintain a sidewalk and part of the case is you should have done X, Y and Z in order to maintain the sidewalk better, then the plaintiff has to identify what the remedial actions are. The same thing here.

MR. ISRAEL: Your Honor, if I may, I think Mr. Friedman partially cites our issues with this interrogatory.

I think fundamentally our biggest problem with this interrogatory, as you'll recall, interrogatories no. 1 and 2, which are identical to the ones that were proffered by Credit Lyonnais, lists all the reasons — if you think that the respective bank violated Section 2339(b) and 2339(c) of the ATA, essentially, what's your basis? Essentially lay out your whole theory of the case.

And really that's what no. 22 is doing also.

It's just flipping it in reverse. Instead of saying why did you violate it, what could you have done to avoid violating

it?

So in response to no. 1, based on what the court ordered with Credit Lyonnais we gave the five-page narrative. We reviewed every single deposition, every single page of paper that was produced by Nat West and was produced by plaintiffs in this case to identify what we thought was irrelevant documents and testify.

And so we acted entirely in accordance with Your Honor's instructions and frankly, no. 20 just seems to be another way of trying to skin the cat. It's just asking the same question in reverse.

It's entirely over broad. It's entirely improper and would require a case-by-case analysis of transactions, of internal correspondence.

You know, Mr. Friedman says that we can just provide bullet points, which in terms of setting up the document makes it sound simpler, but there's really -- using bullet points doesn't make it any easier.

I mean, the entire response to everything NatWest should have done to avoid -- could have done, shouldn't have done to avoid being liable under the ATA, it's massive, just as it was in no. 1 and no. 2. And there's really no difference.

We did -- we understook the effort and we spent dozens of hours to look through the record and to provide

the response that we did.

And if you look at our response to no. 1, we laid out a lengthy narrative, which is just as applicable to this response as it was no. 1 and to no. 2.

And so it's just unclear -- what are they asking for separate from what Your Honor ordered us to do in Credit Lyonnais, which is really the same thing here.

THE COURT: There are -- you could be challenging their failure to institute certain bank policies and procedures that might enable the bank to -- really to ascertain that something was happening that should have made them aware of what was going on with Interpal and (indiscernible) customer policy that was in effect at the time. I don't know. I have no idea.

You know, it is a difficult question to answer because to a certain extent when you're asking about omissions, you might not be able to identify all the omissions, but I think you need to make a good faith effort to try to any (indiscernible) that you may need contending that the bank didn't -- that they didn't (indiscernible) on your radar screen.

Aren't you going to contend they didn't follow the know your customer policy and failed to take whatever measures were necessary?

MR. GLATTER: Well, Your Honor, as defense

counsel's often apt to remind us, this is obviously not a negligence case.

So the question from our standpoint and the problem -- a lot of the problem here focuses on the term "avoid."

Our position, which I think is reflected in the response and the supplemental response is that the defendant is obligated under 2239(b) not to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization.

And under the applicable mens rea standard that I alluded to earlier, is that when they -- when they -- whether or not that means they consult with a barrister or how they decide to go about investigating suspicions is not our burden, is not our issue.

Our issue, which we'll demonstrate, is did the defendant, with a culpable mental state, provide material support to Hamas, a foreign terrorist organization.

Ultimately, ways in which they could have avoided doing that is not something that we bear the burden of demonstrating.

It's not particularly relevant to the claim and if you were to take word "avoid" out and you were to flip this interrogatory to say if you contend that we're liable under 2239(b), tell us why, that would pretty much convert it into a blockbuster interrogatory, the kind that's

typically prohibited by courts.

And this kind of combines the problems with that approach with adding in an irrelevant consideration, one that isn't our burden, as to how from a business judgment standpoint they could have best gone about assuring that they weren't pipelining funds to a U.S. designated foreign terrorist organization, and that's why we believe that the response that's been provided is sufficient and shouldn't require us to engage again in exercises in speculation as to what the best method the defendant could have considered using to make sure it didn't run afoul of that legal prohibition.

MR. FRIEDMAN: I think Your Honor knows that that's not what we're asking them do and invite Mr. Glatter to read the interrogatory and the response, because the response is merely a tautology.

The question asks if you contend there are actions we should have taken, or there are actions we should have refrained from taking in order to avoid liability under these statutes, identify what they are.

Their answer is tautological and they say you shouldn't have violated the statute.

You can't respond to contention interrogatories like that just by saying you shouldn't have violated the statute. You shouldn't have put yourself in a position

where you would get sued.

This interrogatory does not ask them to speculate on what we did. It doesn't ask them to speculate on what we should have refrained from doing.

It says if -- if -- if you contend there are actions we should have taken or actions that we did take that we should have refrained from taking, as a result of which in both instances you claim we're liable under the statute, tell us what those actions are.

I can't imagine anything that is more elemental to a contention interrogatory than to ask that question.

MR. ISRAEL: Your Honor, again, though I think that's you looked no. 1, is because Mr. Glatter said really the reverse of no. 20 is no. 1, which, again, Your Honor, ordered us to provide a response, which we did.

We gave five pages of a narrative which would be directly responsive to no. 20.

And that's why we -- we didn't, as Mr. Friedman said, just object and use some tautology, but we referenced our response to no. 1, which provided this narrative.

THE COURT: Well, I think (indiscernible) what the defendant wants is to identify a series of transfers which identifies --

MR. ISRAEL: But there are hundreds -- there are thousands in this case.

THE COURT: You don't have to identify all of them. You could say transfers beginning such and such a date to such and such entities.

MR. ISRAEL: You know, again, the concern comes back to I guess the concern we had with interrogatory 1 and 2 where providing all of the information in such a blockbuster interrogatory would be massive and near impossible from what your -- if what I understand Your Honor's asking us to do is generally were there transfers to certain entities that NatWest should not have undertaken.

Were there -- well, that's the example Your Honor gave, then perhaps it becomes more limited, but again, our concern with interrogatories 1 and 2, which is the same here, is NatWest then waves this in front of a jury. Waves this in front of yourself or Judge Irizarry and says see, here. This is the totality of plaintiff's response, and in such a massive interrogatory that implicates thousands of document and reams of testimony, that's impossible.

And so they're trying to then cut us off, regardless of what we say that this is plaintiff's answer. They're stuck within these four corners.

We're not trying to hide the ball. We're not trying to hide our contention. That's why our response to no. 1 was rather vigorous, and we spent a lot of time

preparing the narrative and the exhibit.

But if we're asked to beyond that in no. 20, then we're back in the position of the bank trying to limit us when they asked an improper interrogatory.

It's just difficult to know how we could respond to such an interrogatory that literally involves hundreds, thousands of transfers dating over a period of -- really over ten years.

THE COURT: (Indiscernible).

MR. FRIEDMAN: If one of the bullet points is that we shouldn't have made transfers from one day to another, that's one of the bullet points. But there might be other bullet points.

And again, I'm not asking them to make things up. They know what their contentions are. They're obligated to list them.

So if Mr. Israel -- if one of the actions you say you should have taken is to block transfers X, Y and Z, that's one of your bullet points.

But if there are other things you say that we should have done, or that we did do that we shouldn't have done, in order to avoid a trial by ambush, I'm entitled to know what those are.

MR. GLATTER: Your Honor, I'd respectfully submit that again that essentially converts this, or frames

this interrogatory as a blockbuster interrogatory.

It's essentially saying tell us why we're liable.

Tell us why you're going to win at trial, and that's not a proper us of contention interrogatories which is supposed to be a lot more specific.

Issues about block transfers about obviously set forth in expert reports. Those issues can be framed more succinctly at summary judgment, should that occur.

And, again, the bottom line is that the defendant, as a legal matter, is obligated to avoid providing financial services to Hamas.

How it chooses to go about making sure it fulfills that legal obligation is the defendant's business, not ours, and is not something that we should respectfully be put in the position of having to speculate about.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. GLATTER: And that is what the interrogatory, as crafted and frankly I believe as designed, is asking us to do.

THE COURT: Well, I would think that -- and it ties into the example that I gave you that there might be some point in time that you would say very clearly transfers should have been made or (indiscernible).

MR. ISRAEL: There are many points in time, Your Honor. I think that's --

THE COURT: Okay. But that's (indiscernible) identify all the transactions.

MR. ISRAEL: Again, we just want to have a clear understanding because I think Your Honor and plaintiffs both are struggling with what information exactly we'd be expected to provide in response to this interrogatory. I'm still not sure.

I understand transfers generally what the court said, but you get into reports they should have filed, when they should have filed them, when they should have retained more KYC information, which frankly, you know, probably should have happened more often continuously.

THE COURT: Well, you don't have --

MR. ISRAEL: It's just endless --

THE COURT: -- identify each subsequent point in time. You could say as of such and such a date, and, you know, periodically whenever. I would think that after the obligation arises to make inquiry that it would continue to some point in time (indiscernible).

Or if you say (indiscernible) such and such a date there was reason to proceed --

MR. FRIEDMAN: Your Honor, I guess I would only ask, and I apologize if I'm reiterating a point Mr. Israel made, how is that information not already captured in the response and attachments to interrogatory no. 1, which asks

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if we contend that we knowingly -- NatWest knowingly
provided material support or resources to Hamas that the
scienter is sufficient to render it liable for damages
under 2339(b)(A)(1), please specify the basis for those
contentions.
          And both through the narrative in the responsive
and the attachments, the response proceeds to do that.
          So I think minimally there's an obvious
redundancy here.
          THE COURT: That wouldn't be the first time that
that happens in a discovery request.
          MR. ISRAEL: Well, that's why we referenced
interrogatory no. 1 --
          THE COURT: Look. You can reference it, but
you've heard what I've said, so we'll move on.
          On the plaintiff's motion to compel --
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MR. GLATTER: Your Honor, before you move to the -- only because it may be tied -- I know Your Honor received a letter briefing from both myself and Mr. Friedman regarding a request to produce certain documents, which were referenced in Mr. Friedman's motion to compel. So I don't know if you want to take that up now or --

THE COURT: That's fine. I can --

MR. FRIEDMAN: Your Honor, I --

THE COURT: Let me tell you exactly why I ruled

the way I did back in 2008.

It was one of my earlier rulings in this case and it wasn't clearly expressed in my original minute order, but I made a very clear finding as to relevance and what I didn't say expressly in my order is that it was -- I was considering the arguments of the bank as to burdensomeness and also the plaintiff's desire for discovery, which beyond that cutoff date when the account was terminated, which I had no problems with, but we all agreed that the relevance of that information became more attenuated.

So it really -- that one-year cut off date was alluded to originally by the plaintiffs in one of their letters, even though they sought a longer cutoff date -- I think through the present or through 2007.

MR. FRIEDMAN: It was through the present.

MR. GLATTER: Originally through the present --

THE COURT: Yes. But you had talked about a one-year date -- one year time frame and then you were -- and then you changed.

So after considering the arguments, what weighed heavily into my setting of that deadline originally was the fact that the plaintiffs were willing to consider the one-year. It was clear to me that they were entitled to discovery beyond the 2004 date and weighing the burdensomeness to the defendant against the marginal

relevance, I thought that was a reasonable cut off date.

Now I'm going to grant the motion because it's not burdensome for the defendants at this point to produce the report and I don't want any future dispute that arises, in case there is any kind of reference to the report by the defendants, because I'm sure you will regale Judge Irizarry with this nice history of things that the bank did and I don't -- it's not burdensome.

MR. FRIEDMAN: But Your Honor, first of all, we are not going to rely on it in our defense and if anything, our citation of in connection with the litigation over these contention interrogatories makes it relevant only to the litigation of the contention interrogatories, not on the merits of the case.

But how is it relevant? Your Honor, the plaintiffs contend that NatWest had a certain state of mind as of the date of the last attack, September 25 or September 24th, 2004.

How is it relevant what the bank said to the British government two years later?

THE COURT: We went over this three years ago.

Documents as of -- after September, 2004 may have bearing on your state of mind prior to 2004 and that happens all the time.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Well, what I'd like to do, Your

Honor, if I may propose this course, I can represent to Your Honor that these disclosures that were made to the British government don't say anything about the events previously.

All they say is Interpal has presented a check from someone else who was designated as an SDGT and we want you to know about that. And then whey they represented the check there was another disclosure made.

If Your Honor believes that -- as Your Honor just said, these may have relevance to the relevant time period, which ends September, 2004, I would like to submit these disclosures to Your Honor in camera and Your Honor can confirm that they don't say anything about the prior period. They just talk about the fact that these checks -- it's two documents -- that these checks were presented in 2006. That's all they say.

THE COURT: The relevant time period goes beyond September --

MR. FRIEDMAN: Your Honor, it couldn't because they're alleging --

THE COURT: I take it back. The relevant time period does end September, 2004, but the discovery that would arguably yield admissible evidence post dates

September, 2004 and that's what I ruled before and I'm -
if anything, you're going to make me reconsider my ruling

52 1 and think maybe the cut off date was too early. But I'm 2 not going to do that. 3 I'm just inviting Your Honor to -MR. FRIEDMAN: 4 THE COURT: I'm not going to do that. Just 5 6 provide it. 7 All right. We'll provide the two MR. FRIEDMAN: 8 reports. 9 MR. GLATTER: Your Honor, I just have one 10 clarification. I understand Your Honor's order. As you may recall, we also did request to put the disclosures in 11 12 context and for the very reasons that you just mentioned that they're -- from an -- the likelihood of leading to 13 14 admissible evidence, communications and documents that 15 concern those disclosures. 16 And I'm not sure whether or not your order contemplates production of those materials as well. I'd 17 18 respectfully arque that they absolutely are, particularly 19 when one considers that the entity that --20 THE COURT: Mr. Glatter, I mean, based on what 21 Mr. Friedman says, I'm going to require him to produce those reports and if you really feel there's some relevance 22 23 that can be gleaned from the supporting documents, then 24 you'll come back to me.

MR. GLATTER: I understand, Your Honor. Thank

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you.

MR. FRIEDMAN: The last issue, Your Honor, I think is their motion to compel, their contention interrogatory 22.

MR. ISRAEL: That's correct, Your Honor, and I'll be brief.

We know at this point that NatWest is going to say it had proper policies and procedures with regards to suspicions of terrorist financing and if those suspicions led it to believe it should close an account, it would have done so.

We know it's going to argue that with regards to Interpal it followed its procedures and policies properly. It determined that it did not need to close those accounts and, therefore, it did not do so.

But as it acknowledges in the specific contention interrogatory, NatWest also takes a position that it did close accounts and, therefore, there is apparently a standard that NatWest followed when they decided to close these other accounts.

This is really a narrow, simple issue and we're really not asking for much information. We narrowed the scope of our request -- of the contention interrogatory significantly with Mr. Friedman in just asking for the basis, the specific basis, and that's significant because

the key compliance employee at NatWest during this time,
Mr. Hossesan (ph), one of the primary policy employees
during this time, Ms. Gale, they both testified that sure,
on a case by case basis, they might assess these accounts,
but both of them said that they needed to see the criminal
conviction, or they needed to see a U.K. designation. They
needed to see some finite piece of data to convince them to
close these accounts.

The only way we can test their position that they're saying that NatWest thoroughly followed its procedure for Interpal and decided not to close those accounts, and that decision was proper in accordance with its own policy setting aside anything else, is by testing how they treated these other customers, where obviously they decided okay, we need to close these accounts.

And with Friends of Al Aqsa, for instance, one of apparently at least five customers that NatWest did decide to close, and temporarily in this case -- in fact, Friends of Al Aqsa, there was no designation. There was no criminal conviction.

It was simply the case that in late 2004 NatWest decided to close the Friends of Aqsa accounts on suspicions of terror financing.

They reversed that decision a few weeks later when they received a lot of pressures and they decided it

wasn't worth it and they reopened the accounts. And the actual reasons we can -- you know, that's irrelevant in terms of why they decided to reopen the account.

But they decided to close the account without any criminal conviction, without any U.K. designation, which is contrary to the testimony of Mr. Hossesan and Ms. Gale and Mr. Friedman -- excuse me. NatWest's letter mischaracterized saying that Mr. Hossesan simply said well, it was a case by case basis.

He ultimately said sure. They look at the facts of each case, but he gave us specific reasons he could think of why they would close customer's accounts and for NatWest to take the position that this somehow is not relevant, Interpal obviously -- Interpal's accounts weren't in a vacuum. It wasn't the one account of NatWest it just focused on with tunnel vision.

Certainly, there are these other accounts that it decided to close at the same time it was continuously deciding to keep Interpal's accounts open, in spite of what we contend were continuing alarm bells that should have gone off.

And so again the only way that we can test, based on NatWest's own policies, what would actually lead it to close accounts, because it didn't do so for Interpal, is by looking at these comparatives.

And that's why when we had these meet and confer sessions with Mr. Friedman we said if -- whether it was five customers, seven customers, however many it was, if it was because each was designated by Her Majesty's Treasury, fine. Say that.

And we're not asking for -- we're not getting into provide us with the account documents. Provide us with the transactional records.

We're not getting into any of that. These aren't requests for production.

This is simply NatWest is contending that even though it didn't close Interpal's accounts on suspicion of terror financing, it did decide to close others. And we simply want to know why.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Your Honor, Mr. Israel's argument just proved why this is irrelevant. This case is not about whether NatWest acted consistently with its policies or consistently with its actions in other instances in deciding not to close Interpal's accounts. That's not what this case is about.

Mr. Israel just said the only way we can test — the only way we can test. Test what? What is it issue in this case is not whether we should have closed the accounts. It's not a negligence case. We're not on trial for failing to follow our own policies.

The only relevant test is did we know, or as they argue, were we willfully blind to whether Interpal -Interpal -- Interpal was financing Hamas or Hamas terrorism.

What we did with other customers has nothing to do with this at all and this is a complete fishing expedition.

If it turns out that other customers were closed, or were not closed, or there were reasons that the customers were closed, reasons that the customers were not closed, so what? It's completely irrelevant. It has nothing to do with the issue at hand.

And there's a bit of a shell game going on here. They're saying the want to know about this so that they can test NatWest's reasons for not closing Interpal.

This case is not about the legitimacy of
NatWest's reasons for not closing Interpal. It's whether
NatWest knew or was willfully blind to whether Interpal was
funding Hamas or Hamas terrorism. So it's just completely
irrelevant.

MR. ISRAEL: But Your Honor, the credibility of the testimony of these witnesses who said they had to have some genuine suspicion and what exactly was a genuine suspicion, which apparently they never had with Interpal in spite of the U.S. designation, in spite of everything that

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       went on, again, what we saw with Friends of Al Aqsa is
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        apparently there was a lesser standard for that customer.
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                  MR. FRIEDMAN:
                                  Well, I'm surprised --
                  THE COURT: Well, wait. Stop. Stop.
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                  MR. FRIEDMAN: -- that Mr. Israel would say that
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                  THE COURT: Stop. Stop.
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                  MR. FRIEDMAN: -- because we did suspect them.
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                  THE COURT: Mr. Friedman, why didn't you just
        follow up with discovery after the Hossesan deposition?
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                  MR. ISRAEL: Well, Your Honor, for instance, with
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       Mr. Hossesan's deposition, I believe the cut off to proffer
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       written discovery was March of '010. We deposed Ms. Gale in
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        later October of '010. She was the last one, because she
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       was a Hague witness. She happened well after the close of
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        discovery and then we moved onto experts.
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                  I mean, frankly, that's why we're not saying --
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       we're obviously not asking at this late date for documents.
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                  MR. FRIEDMAN: Mr. Israel, please. You made
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        follow up requests --
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                  MR. ISRAEL: Can I finish?
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                  MR. FRIEDMAN: You made --
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                  MR. ISRAEL: Can I finish? As much as you --
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                  MR. FRIEDMAN: But, Your Honor, they --
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                  THE COURT: Let him finish, Mr. Friedman.
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                  MR. ISRAEL: I mean --
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                  MR. FRIEDMAN:
                                 What he's saying is just not
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        true.
                  THE COURT: Stop. Stop. Mr. Friedman --
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                  MR. ISRAEL: Let's not put on a show here and act
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 7
        amused. I mean, let's not make this into a game.
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                  THE COURT: You'll get your chance to speak.
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                  MR. ISRAEL: Well, Your Honor, again, you're
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                 We didn't ask for documents pertaining to these
        accounts and, frankly, we took -- Your Honor was quite
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        clear a long time ago in terms of the account information
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        that we could ask for and I think we actually made a list
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        and that's why we didn't come back and say give us -- we're
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        not going to undertake this. You know, give us all the
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        transactions, the thousands of transaction for this
        customer at this late date and then we'll conduct a
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        comparison. We're asking simply why did you close the
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        account.
                 That's it.
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                  Which it's astounding to us -- I mean, Mr.
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        Friedman's amused. We're frankly astounded that given that
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        there were at least five accounts that were closed on
23
        suspicions of terror financing and they can't find them
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        now?
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                  And this Goalkeeper system -- this self acclaimed
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Goalkeeper system, which was designed to record all suspicions and be able to search those suspicions, they can't search for terror financing and find which accounts were closed? That's just unbelievable.

MR. FRIEDMAN: I'm sad for a couple of reasons, Your Honor. I'm sad because Mr. Israel is just saying things that are just not true.

First of all, the document that refers to the five accounts was produced to Mr. Israel in 2009. They never made any follow up request about those five accounts.

THE COURT: Just correct me if I'm wrong, but I gather they're all accounts involving the same customer?

MR. FRIEDMAN: I don't know one way or the other and that's another reason that this is saddening, Your Honor, because there is considerable burden in trying to identify what these documents are. Believe me, if there weren't, we would have told them.

Discovery ended more than a year ago. This document was produced in 2009.

THE COURT: I know that.

MR. FRIEDMAN: This is grossly untimely and it's not a question of stonewalling them. It's a question of now a year after discovery ending, two years after this document is produced, having to go back and look for this information again is just not fair.

Now as I represented to the court, and I can represent again today, we have looked into the Goalkeeper system and this information is not self evident. It would have to be an extensive granular search of documents in the Goalkeeper system which would take a substantial amount of time in order to extract this information.

And with plaintiffs having sat on this for two years, we should not be required to do that. Enough is enough, especially when considered in light of the irrelevance of this information.

MR. ISRAEL: Well, Your Honor, a few points.

First, we'd certain take the position that it was made relevant by the testimony of NatWest, which happened last summer and into last fall.

It think the other thing is looking at your September '08 order, where you did ask us to make a final list of entities for which we wanted written discovery and, frankly, in accordance with that we didn't then receive this document in the Summer of 2009 and ask for the account file because you gave us this final date and we respected that, certainly, and had no problem with that.

But that's why, again, we're not asking for the account file.

Again, if NatWest is saying that -- I don't know whether it's had so many accounts its closed on suspicions

of terror financing, or there are so few, how can it not know this information? It's simply astounding to us.

Again, the Friends of Al Aqsa file showed that the testimony of Mr. Hossesan and Ms. Gale was not accurate.

And so we want to know about these other customers as well.

MR. FRIEDMAN: We are not saying -- it's tough, Your Honor, when just complete misstatements just get made again, and again, and again.

We're not saying we don't have this information. We're saying to ask us to go through the effort to get this information two years after the document was produced, one year after discovery ended is wrong. This information may be in the bank's filed, but it would take a tremendous effort to find it.

And I've been on the phone with my client over the last three weeks trying to figure out if there is a non-unduly burdensome way in which to extract this information and there isn't.

THE COURT: Well, you did offer to continue making a reasonable search for this information. What does that mean?

MR. FRIEDMAN: What that means, Your Honor, is if Your Honor directs us to do so, we can continue to look

in the Goalkeeper system. And there are ways -- they're very burdensome ways, but there are ways, but there are ways we can continue to look in the Goalkeeper system.

But if we have to go back to -- which is an electronic system.

If we have to go back to hard copy documents that are all stored in boxes in remote locations -- and these are boxes that we went through four or five years ago to produce documents in response to their request and to tell my client that I now have to go to Iron Mountain and get these boxes back, we can continue to think of strategies for extracting this information from the Goalkeeper database, but anything beyond that would just be unreasonable.

MR. GLATTER: Your Honor, if I could just make two points. One is given that these are terror financing suspicions, while, of course, this is not a negligence case. It is a little troubling to hear that it would be that problematic to be able to find something, given the threat level represented by the suspicion.

But secondly, we spent no small amount of time this afternoon discussing why it was appropriate to have the plaintiffs supplement their contention interrogatories based on the premise that it was quite relevant to be able to point out the action, or inaction, by the British

government is somehow suggestive of the defendant's scienter or mens rea, with respect to its decision to continue doing business with Interpal.

I respectfully suggest that it's -- if that is relevant, then it is extremely relevant to know how the defendant winds up treating in house its own terrorism suspicion files that its identified, particularly when those entities, such as Friends of Al Aqsa, have not apparently wound up on the radar of the British government to the same degree as Interpal.

One, I would submit that the later is far more relevant than the former.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Your Honor, if I may, just one sentence. Thinking about this this morning I was wondering what kind of arguments plaintiffs would make and I was going to say are they going to say that if what we're looking for is relevant, then this is relevant? And sure enough, Mr. Glatter did.

The material difference, of course, is that what we're asking about all relates to Interpal. What they're asking about relates to five other customers.

Your Honor, if Your Honor thinks that this is relevant, we can continue to look in Goalkeeper and that's where we are.

MR. ISRAEL: Your Honor, I would just submit, our

one concern again is having an understanding of what the reasonable search is.

Again, we laid out we're not -- goalkeeper obviously isn't in any of our systems. We had a few corporate representatives who testified about it and to the best we could, we laid out where it would seem like they could find this information. Obviously, we don't know that.

So what we're simply trying to make sure of is a reasonable search, again, seeming like it -- seemingly impossible to us that NatWest could not find this information within its system.

We just want to make sure that reasonable means that they're doing everything they can within this goalkeeper system to try to find this information.

We're not asking about going to Chicago or wherever the -- however many boxes are held. We're asking about the goalkeeper system here.

THE COURT: Okay. I have no problems requiring the defendant to continue search on the goalkeeper system.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Okay. We'll do that.

THE COURT: Because, you know, to the extent that the treatment was consistent with how NatWest treated other customers, I mean that arguably is relevant and I'm not going to make any arguments for either side, you know, as

to what value you can make -- I mean, what you can make of this kind of information.

At the most basic level you need to provide the information.

I'm a little surprised that it appears -- I mean,
do you have the account numbers that were closed, or am I
just misreading --

MR. FRIEDMAN: No, we don't.

THE COURT: Those account numbers deal with a Al Aqsa.

MR. FRIEDMAN: The first step is identifying the account numbers. The first step in going through

Goalkeeper, because -- but we do not have the account numbers. If we did, we wouldn't be arguing about this.

THE COURT: Okay. I'll ask you to continue searching.

MR. FRIEDMAN: The Goalkeeper system.

Your Honor, the last point is we had agreed that we would set a schedule today for the submission of premotion --

MR. ISRAEL: Mr. Friedman, without cutting you off, I wanted to get a sense of how long we're going to talk about the supplemental responses, because we had discussed the dates, and I just wanted to make sure in light of the timing we're talking about for supplemental

responses that it still makes the schedule work.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Well, you tell me. The last time we submitted our pre-motion conference letters before there were supplemental responses. I'm happy to do that.

MR. ISRAEL: We did and I think we can still do that. Again, we're balancing this out against -- not this case. We have summary judgment briefing in the other case, so we just want to make sure from a scheduling standpoint -

THE COURT: Well, why don't we talk about the dates for production and then that might inform the setting of the deadlines for the pre-motion letters.

MR. FRIEDMAN: I suspect, to be on the safe side, I should have three weeks to do what more I an on Goalkeeper knowing how long it's taken to get to where they are.

So that would be --

THE COURT: October 6th.

MR. FRIEDMAN: October 6th.

MR. ISRAEL: Your Honor, I guess in light of what else is going on with these cases and what we may or may not have to do with no. 20 I guess we'd ask for maybe October 13th, just to extend it out an extra week.

MR. FRIEDMAN: No objection.

Do the dates for the pre-motion letter still work

68 1 for you? 2 MR. ISRAEL: Yes, I think that's fine. 3 THE COURT: What are the dates for the pre-motion 4 letters? 5 Well, I'm told there will be no MR. FRIEDMAN: plaintiff's summary judgment motion, unlike in the Credit 6 7 Lyonnais cases, so we propose to submit our pre-motion letter to Judge Irizarry on September 28th. 8 9 THE COURT: 28th? 10 September 28th. And plaintiffs MR. FRIEDMAN: will submit their response on October 7, and I believe last 11 12 time Your Honor communicated those dates to Judge Irizarry, who proposed conferences dates to us. 13 14 MR. ISRAEL: I guess one thing we didn't talk 15 about was page length, which is different, because in 16 Credit Lyonnais we're dealing with two issues; sequencing and the substance. 17 18 I'm happy to abide by Judge MR. FRIEDMAN: 19 Irizarry's three-page rule. MR. ISRAEL: That's fine. 20 21 Your Honor, after the Credit Lyonnais motion to 22 compel hearing you submitted a minute order. I'm kind of 23 going through your rulings. Do you plan to do the same 24 here? 25 THE COURT: I try to do that. It's difficult

enough trying to remember my past rulings. I try to forget them and I hate Westlaw and Lexis for picking up decisions I'd rather not see again.

But let's just talk about administrative matters first.

One is just a simple one, which is -- I don't know if you've noticed the four cases that all of you are involved in are linked on the docket sheet and there have been no formal consolidation agreements -- orders with respect to the two sets of cases.

I assume the parties don't object to consolidating the two NatWest cases and the two Credit Lyonnais cases.

MR. ISRAEL: For purposes of trial?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. ISRAEL: Well --

THE COURT: Why don't you think about it. I would think it makes sense. We initially basically have treated these -- all four cases as consolidated for discovery cases, but the two sets of cases have gone their separate ways.

What I will do on the docket sheet, in case you find some value in it, is to not -- de-link the four cases at this point.

MR. FRIEDMAN: I think that's been done, Your

Honor. We received notices this week that this was done.

THE COURT: No, no. They -- who --

MR. FRIEDMAN: We received a notice from the clerk's office that the two NatWest cases would be linked and the two Credit Lyonnais cases would be linked.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, then my assistant acted more quickly than I thought.

MR. FRIEDMAN: But that the four cases would not be linked together.

THE COURT: Right. And so that will enable you and Strauss to file -- to just make one filing in the two cases and you were always able to do that in the Weiss case anyway; link it to any other case.

Now on the protective order, what I will do is simply amend I think Section 4(f), dealing with the ceiling.

I am issuing an order, you know, as required by the Second Circuit in *Lugosh*, to make specific findings as to the ceiling of the underlying documents; the bank documents and the tracking documents and I'll roll into that the personal information of the plaintiffs.

So I do have a question about that, so that we don't have to keep going back and amending the definitions for what can be sealed.

I am not touching the original agreements in your

designation of what's confidential. I am simply defining the scope of documents that can be filed under seal and what information should be redacted in the order to be issued.

So you'll abide by whatever agreements you have on designations. That's not a concern of the court and it makes it a lot easier, so that we don't have to superimpose on the past designations the more limited category; hopefully, more limited categories that we've discussed regarding sealing.

I did discuss the matter with Judge Irizarry. Her preference is just simply to have documents that are clearly sealed and documents that are not.

I know you've already served the initial set of motion papers, right, in Strauss. So maybe what you could do is have filings -- separate filings for documents that are either redacted or filed under seal. Does that make it too difficult?

So, for instance, your memoranda of law will be publicly filed with redactions. If you have supporting affidavits, with sealed exhibits, don't -- I don't want the affidavits to be completely sealed. I don't know if you have the capacity to seal just the exhibit. I'll have to check.

We'll work this out with the -- discuss just the

logistics of doing this and when you did public file the redacted documents, as you can see from the notice that we filed it, it was very backwards since there was no rhyme or reason to your attachments.

So try to be more organized in how you file exhibits and attachments. Don't -- I know it's more onerous for you to file them separately. If you can group them, that's okay, but don't have one exhibit overlapping into another filing -- filed document, because I know there are restrictions on the length of documents you can file.

But anyway, if we need a less on that we'll just talk privately with you later about it.

Now, the most difficult aspect of the confidentiality order is the redactions that need to be undertaken and I've forgotten to bring down the proposed redactions that both sides submitted.

What is telling is in the few cases where there's an overlap in suggested redactions, that the plaintiffs are actually redacting more than what the defendants had proposed.

I do have a question about the -- one of the experts who did the number crunching and I know --

MR. GLATTER: Mr. Geiser?

THE COURT: No. It's a two-name -- Nealy and --

MR. GLATTER: Mr. Geiser is the witness from

Nigel and Riley.

THE COURT: Okay. Anyway, I don't think it's a surprise if I can share with the plaintiff that you did propose -- submit some proposed redactions as to some of the plaintiff's expert reports.

So I -- they provide actually a good basis for us to talk about what redactions would be appropriate and you had actually redacted all references to Nigel and Reilly in your -- in one of the reports.

A lot of the footnotes -- I can understand redactions relating to customers that -- or transferees who were never identified publicly before, but as to some of the sources of information, a lot of it came from the expert report of Nigel and Reilly and I don't know why that was --

MR. GLATTER: If I understand, Your Honor, just so I have it clear it my mind.

I think what you're referring to is the fact that certain of our other experts, for example, Dr. Matthew

Levitz, may have referenced certain transactions processed by Credit Lyonnais, or by NatWest, as the case may be, and identified by Bates number -- identified within -- I guess in the Nigel and Reilly report, where it referenced transfer --

THE COURT: Could you just hold on a sec? Maybe

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        it will be easier if I have Josh go up and if you don't
        mind, I'll share your proposed redactions?
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                  MR. FRIEDMAN:
                                  I honestly don't know what Your
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        Honor's referring to.
                  THE COURT: I had asked for representative
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        documents that you might be filing and you would mark the
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 7
        places that you think ought to be redacted.
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                  And I gave you the option of filing them -- of
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        submitting theme ex parte and both sides did.
                  So I wanted to -- I would like to look at the
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        expert reports with you and talk through some of the
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        redactions to get a better handle on --
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                  MR. FRIEDMAN: If I may, Your Honor, I don't
        think this is -- that I'm equipped to do it now because I
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15
        would have to have others of my colleagues who did the
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        redactions --
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                  MR. GLATTER: I believe in our case I think Mr.
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        Goldman's office submitted the redactions and so I can
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        certainly give it the college try --
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                  THE COURT: Okay. Then maybe we need to --
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MR. FRIEDMAN: If we could have a telephone conference, if Your Honor wishes --THE COURT: I'd actually like to talk to you

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before completing my order, because the toughest part of the order is --

MR. FRIEDMAN: Can I suggest this to Your Honor.

If you would like to just give us a call, or have Mr.

Prushesky just give us a call.

THE COURT: Well, I'd like to have it together and perhaps to have the -- okay. Then why don't we do that and you'll tell him who we need to talk to.

And if you think it would be useful to have a joint -- another -- a conference by telephone, I'll do that.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Yes, why don't we do that, if Your Honor proposes to us a time for a telephone conference, we can do that.

Because, Your Honor, I think the best thing to do

-- another reason to do it that way is that if I can have
in front of me that submission that we made, and unredacted
versions of that submission, I can tell Your Honor exactly
why we did what we did.

THE COURT: Well, why don't you come to chambers after this -- you sent me many, many copies.

I hopefully won't be getting documents from you in the future but as far as I'm concerned, if you ever send more documents, you can always -- you only need to send me one set because you don't need to do it for every -- for each of the cases.

But in any event, why don't we come - I'll show

76 1 Mr. Friedman what you sent. I have many copies of that. 2 if that's -- if you feel it's all right for me to share it 3 with the plaintiff's counsel, then I'll give you a set. 4 MR. FRIEDMAN: Okay. 5 THE COURT: But you just marked where the redactions would be, I think. So it's a good working 6 7 document to -- so I'll met you upstairs. (Proceedings concluded at 3:45 p.m.) 8 9 I, CHRISTINE FIORE, Certified Electronic Court 10 Reporter and Transcriber and court-approved transcriber, 11 certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the 12 official electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter. 13 14 Christine Fiere 15 September 18, 2011 16 17 Christine Fiore, CERT 18 19 20 21 22 23 24